The Federalist No. 85
Concluding Remarks
Independent Journal
Wednesday, August 13, Saturday, August 16, 1788
[Alexander Hamilton]
To the People of the State of New
York:
According
to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first
number, there would appear still to remain for discussion two points: "the
analogy of the proposed government to your own State constitution," and
"the
additional security which its adoption will afford to republican government, to
liberty, and to property." But these heads have been so fully anticipated
and exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be
possible to do any thing more than repeat, in a more dilated form, what has been
heretofore said, which the advanced stage of the question, and the time already
spent upon it, conspire to forbid.
It is remarkable, that the
resemblance of the plan of the convention to the act which organizes the
government of this State holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed
defects, than to the real excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects
are the re-eligibility of the Executive, the want of a council, the omission of
a formal bill of rights, the omission of a provision respecting the liberty of
the press. These and several others which have been noted in the course of our
inquiries are as much chargeable on the existing constitution of this State, as
on the one proposed for the Union; and a man must have slender pretensions to
consistency, who can rail at the latter for imperfections which he finds no
difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed can there be a better proof of
the insincerity and affectation of some of the zealous adversaries of the plan
of the convention among us, who profess to be the devoted admirers of the
government under which they live, than the fury with which they have attacked
that plan, for matters in regard to which our own constitution is equally or
perhaps more vulnerable.
The additional securities to
republican government, to liberty and to property, to be derived from the
adoption of the plan under consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints
which the preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and
insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who
may acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become
the despots of the people; in the diminution of the opportunities to foreign
intrigue, which the dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate;
in the prevention of extensive military establishments, which could not fail to
grow out of wars between the States in a disunited situation; in the express
guaranty of a republican form of government to each; in the absolute and
universal exclusion of titles of nobility; and in the precautions against the
repetition of those practices on the part of the State governments which have
undermined the foundations of property and credit, have planted mutual distrust
in the breasts of all classes of citizens, and have occasioned an almost
universal prostration of morals.
Thus have I, fellow-citizens,
executed the task I had assigned to myself; with what success, your conduct must
determine. I trust at least you will admit that I have not failed in the
assurance I gave you respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be
conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and have studiously
avoided those asperities which are too apt to disgrace political disputants of
all parties, and which have been not a little provoked by the language and
conduct of the opponents of the Constitution. The charge of a conspiracy against
the liberties of the people, which has been indiscriminately brought against the
advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton and too malignant, not to
excite the indignation of every man who feels in his own bosom a refutation of
the calumny. The perpetual changes which have been rung upon the wealthy, the
well-born, and the great, have been such as to inspire the disgust of all
sensible men. And the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations which
have been in various ways practiced to keep the truth from the public eye, have
been of a nature to demand the reprobation of all honest men. It is not
impossible that these circumstances may have occasionally betrayed me into
intemperances of expression which I did not intend; it is certain that I have
frequently felt a struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the former
has in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been neither
often nor much.
Let us now pause and ask ourselves
whether, in the course of these papers, the proposed Constitution has not been
satisfactorily vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has
not been shown to be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary to the
public safety and prosperity. Every man is bound to answer these questions to
himself, according to the best of his conscience and understanding, and to act
agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates of his judgment. This is a duty from
which nothing can give him a dispensation. 'T is one that he is called upon,
nay, constrained by all the obligations that form the bands of society, to
discharge sincerely and honestly. No partial motive, no particular interest, no
pride of opinion, no temporary passion or prejudice, will justify to himself, to
his country, or to his posterity, an improper election of the part he is to act.
Let him beware of an obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect that the
object upon which he is to decide is not a particular interest of the community,
but the very existence of the nation; and let him remember that a majority of
America has already given its sanction to the plan which he is to approve or
reject.
I shall not dissemble that I feel
an entire confidence in the arguments which recommend the proposed system to
your adoption, and that I am unable to discern any real force in those by which
it has been opposed. I am persuaded that it is the best which our political
situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior to any the revolution
has produced.
Concessions on the part of the
friends of the plan, that it has not a claim to absolute perfection, have
afforded matter of no small triumph to its enemies. "Why," say they, "should we
adopt an imperfect thing? Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is
irrevocably established?" This may be plausible enough, but it is only
plausible. In the first place I remark, that the extent of these concessions has
been greatly exaggerated. They have been stated as amounting to an admission
that the plan is radically defective, and that without material alterations the
rights and the interests of the community cannot be safely confided to it. This,
as far as I have understood the meaning of those who make the concessions, is an
entire perversion of their sense. No advocate of the measure can be found, who
will not declare as his sentiment, that the system, though it may not be perfect
in every part, is, upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the present
views and circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an one as
promises every species of security which a reasonable people can desire.
I answer in the next place, that I
should esteem it the extreme of imprudence to prolong the precarious state of
our national affairs, and to expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive
experiments, in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see
a perfect work from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of all
collective bodies must necessarily be a compound, as well of the errors and
prejudices, as of the good sense and wisdom, of the individuals of whom they are
composed. The compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States in a common
bond of amity and union, must as necessarily be a compromise of as many
dissimilar interests and inclinations. How can perfection spring from such
materials?
The reasons assigned in an
excellent little pamphlet lately published in this city,1
are unanswerable to show the utter improbability of assembling a new convention,
under circumstances in any degree so favorable to a happy issue, as those in
which the late convention met, deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the
arguments there used, as I presume the production itself has had an extensive
circulation. It is certainly well worthy the perusal of every friend to his
country. There is, however, one point of light in which the subject of
amendments still remains to be considered, and in which it has not yet been
exhibited to public view. I cannot resolve to conclude without first taking a
survey of it in this aspect.
It appears to me susceptible of
absolute demonstration, that it will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than
previous amendments to the Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the
present plan, it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must
undergo a new decision of each State. To its complete establishment throughout
the Union, it will therefore require the concurrence of thirteen States. If, on
the contrary, the Constitution proposed should once be ratified by all the
States as it stands, alterations in it may at any time be effected by nine
States. Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to nine2
in favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the original adoption of an
entire system.
This is not all. Every
Constitution for the United States must inevitably consist of a great variety of
particulars, in which thirteen independent States are to be accommodated in
their interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see, in any
body of men charged with its original formation, very different combinations of
the parts upon different points. Many of those who form a majority on one
question, may become the minority on a second, and an association dissimilar to
either may constitute the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding
and arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole, in such a
manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and hence, also, an immense
multiplication of difficulties and casualties in obtaining the collective assent
to a final act. The degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio
to the number of particulars and the number of parties.
But every amendment to the
Constitution, if once established, would be a single proposition, and might be
brought forward singly. There would then be no necessity for management or
compromise, in relation to any other point -- no giving nor taking. The will of
the requisite number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And
consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of
a particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place. There can,
therefore, be no comparison between the facility of affecting an amendment, and
that of establishing in the first instance a complete Constitution.
In opposition to the probability
of subsequent amendments, it has been urged that the
persons
delegated to the administration of the national government will always be
disinclined to yield up any portion of the authority of which they were once
possessed. For my own part I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any
amendments which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be
applicable to the organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers;
and on this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observation just
stated. I also think there is little weight in it on another account. The
intrinsic difficulty of governing THIRTEEN STATES at any rate, independent of
calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity, will, in my
opinion constantly impose on the national rulers the necessity of
a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their constituents.
But there is yet a further consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of
a doubt, that the observation is futile. It is this that the national rulers,
whenever nine States concur, will have no option upon the subject.
By the fifth
article of the plan, the Congres will be obliged "on the application
of the legislatures of two thirds of the States [which at present amount to
nine], to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be valid,
to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the
legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by conventions in three fourths
thereof."
The words of this article are peremptory. The
Congress "shall
call a convention." Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that
body. And of consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to a
change vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite
two thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which may
affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty
in a union on points which are merely relative to the general liberty or
security of the people.
We may safely rely on the disposition of the State
legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the national
authority.
If the foregoing argument is a
fallacy, certain it is that I am myself deceived by it, for it is, in my
conception, one of those rare instances in which a political truth can be
brought to the test of a mathematical demonstration. Those who see the matter in
the same light with me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must agree
in the propriety of a previous adoption, as the most direct road to their own
object.
The zeal for attempts to amend,
prior to the establishment of the Constitution, must abate in every man who is
ready to accede to the truth of the following observations of a writer equally
solid and ingenious: "To balance a large state or society [says he], whether
monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty,
that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason
and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in the work;
EXPERIENCE must guide their labor; TIME must bring it to perfection, and the
FEELING of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they inevitably
fall into in their first trials and experiments."3
These judicious reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere
lovers of the Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against hazarding
anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States from each other, and
perhaps the military despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the pursuit of what
they are not likely to obtain, but from TIME and EXPERIENCE. It may be in me a
defect of political fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an
equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a longer
continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A NATION, without a NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT, is, in my view, an awful spectacle. The establishment of a
Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary ocnsent of a whole
people, is a PRODIGY, to the completion of which I look forward with trembling
anxiety. I can reconcile it to no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now
have, in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States, and
after having passed over so considerable a part of the ground, to recommence the
course. I dread the more the consequences of new attempts, because I know that
POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS, in this and in other States, are enemies to a general
national government in every possible shape.
PUBLIUS
1. Entitled "An Address to the People of the State of New
York."
2. It may rather be said TEN, for
though two thirds may set on foot the measure, three fourths must ratify.
3. Hume's Essays, Vol. I, p. 128: "The Rise of Arts
and Sciences."
|
Note: The content of this web page is republished on the Internet by kind
permission of
the Constitution Society, and is not
a copyright of Citizens for United States Direct Initiatives. |
|
